Der k. u. k. Reichshriegsminister
Franz Freiherr von Schönaich
Franz Xavier Vincenz Karl
SCHÖNAICH
27 Feb 1844 - 28 Jan 1916 @ Wien, Niederösterreich
......."[österr. Adel und Frhr.
Fschl. 12. Aug 1908],
.......k. u. k. Grat, Gen. der Inf. i.
R., vorm. Reichskriegsmin."
a son of Wilhelmina Khym
& Franz Schönaich
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Österr. Biographisches Lexikon:
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. Die Votivkirche
in the 9th district of Vienna
.
at which the funeral Mass for Franz Freiherr von Schönaich
was celebrated in 1916.The church was built in the 1870s to commemorate
Kaiser Franz Josef I.'s survival
of an assassination attempt in 1853.
The Gothic ediface was inaugurated in 1879
at the silver anniversay
of the Kaiser's wedding to Kaiserin Elizabeth.
Mathilde Freifrau von Schönaich gibt schmerzerfüllt von dem tiefbetrübenden Ableben
ihres innigstgeliebten Gattin, bezw. Stiefvaters, Groß-, Urgroßvaters und Onkels,Seiner Exzellens des hochwohlgeborenen Herrn
k. u. k. Geheimen Rat, General der InfanterieFranz Freiherrn von Schönaich, Großkreuz des St. Stephan-Ordens, Großkreuz des Leopold-Ordens, Ritter des Ordens der Eisernen
Krone I. Klasse, Ritter des preuß. Kronenordens I. Kl., des preuß. Roten Adlerordens I. Kl. mit
dem Sterne, Großkreuz des sächsischen Albrecht-Ordens, Großkreuz des spanischen Isabella-Ordens,
Comturkreuz des württembergischen Kronenordens mit dem Sterne, Oberstinhaber des k. u. k.
In-fanterieregimentes Nr. 74, Kriegsminister a D.welcher am 28. Jänner 1916 nach Wmpfang der hl. Sterbesakramente sanft im Herrn entschlafen ist. Die irdische Hülle des teuren Verblichenen wird Montag, den 31. Jänner 1916 präz. 1 Uhr nachmittags in der Leichenhofkapelle des k. u. k. Garnisonsspitales Nr. 1 (IX. Bezirk, Sensengasse Nr. 2) eingesegnet hierauf in die Propstei-Pfarrkirche zum göttlichen Heiland Votiv-kirche überführt, daselbts um 1/2 2 Uhr nochmals feierlich eingesegbet und sodann auf dem Hietzinger Friedhofe in der Familien-Gruft zur ewigen Ruhe beigesetzt. Die heilige Seelenmesse wird Dienstag, den 1. Februar um 9 Uhr vormittags in obiger Propstei-Pfarrkirche gelesen.
Wien, XIII, Rosentalgasse 14, am 29. Jänner 1916.Artur Przyborski, ...............................................................................................Carl Freiherr von Hiller-Schönaich,
k. u. k. Feldmarschallleutnant, ....................................................................................k.k. Hofrat der Landesregierung Salzburg
Alfred Ressig, ....................................................................................................Dr. Hans Freiherr von Hiller-Schönaich
k. k. Sektionschef im Eisenbahn-Ministerium,.................................................................. k. k. Hofrat des Verwaltungs-Gerichtshofes,
......................................................................................................................... derzeit im Felde,
als Stiefschwiegersöhne............................................................................................. als Stiefsöhne,
Alice Freifrau von Hiller-Schönaich,.....................................................................Oda Przyborski,
als Stiefschwiegertochter,...........................................................................................Vilma Ressig,
.........................................................................................................................als Stieftöchter,sowie sämtliche Enkel, Urenkel, Neffen und Nichten. Neues Wiener Journal
29 Jänner 1916G. d. I. Franz Freiherr
v. SchönaichÝ.Infolge eines Schlaganfalles. Gestern ist G. d. I. Franz Freiherr v. Schönaich infolge eines Schlaganfalles plötzlich gestorben. General v. Schönaich war gestern nebst mehreren anderen Persönlichkeiten im Hause des Groß-industriellen Bernhard Wetzler beim Diner zu Gaste. Gegen 1/2 3 Uhr nachmittags wurde Freiherr.v. Schönaich, der von einiger Zeit einen leichten Schlaganfall erlitten hatte, vor einem heftigen Unwohlsein befallen. Es wurde sofort die Rettungsgesellschaft avisiert, doch konnte der Arzt nur mehr den eingetretenen Tod feststellen. Mit dem General der Infanterie Franz Freiherrn v. Schönaich, dem ehemaligen Kriegsminister ist eine Persönlichkeit dahingeschieden, die in der Geschichte der Armee ein ruhmvolles Blatt füllt. Man kann sagen, daß der Kriegsminister Schönaich derjenige war, der zuerst auf die Notwendigkeit einer Heeres- reform hingewiesen hat, die, wenn es auch nicht ihm beschieden war, sie durchzuführen, doch die Armee der Monarchie auf jene Höhe gehoben hat, die sie jetzt im Weltkriege inne hat und die ihr die Bewunderung selbst ihrer Feinde sichert. Fast in Vergessenheit geraten sind bereits jene Zeiten, in denen der Kriegsminister v. Schönaich im Mittelpunkte des Interesses stand, weil er die Frage aufgeworfen habe, ob die Armee verdorren solle, verdorren dadurch, daß ihr die Parlamente nicht die genügenden Mittel zur Verfügung stellten, sich zu reorganisieren. Das Wort Schönaichs "Die Armee verdorrt" ist ein geflügeltes Wort geworden und wird für immer mit seinem Namen verknüpft sein. Er war, nachdem er jahrelang dem Erzherzog Albrecht zugeteilt war, nach einer kurzen Zeit, in der er ein Divisionskommando innehatte, im Jahre 1905 Landesverteidigungsminister geworden und wurde bereits 1906 zum Reichskriegsminister, wie es damals hieß, ernannt, als Nachfolger Baron Pitreichs. Es war damals gerade der schwere Kampf um die Heeresreform im Gange. Schönaich verlangte die Mittel, um das Heer ausgestalten zu können. Er was es, der beispielweise die Maschinengewehre in der Armee einführte, mit einem Worte, eine ganze Anzahl dringend notwendiger Ergänzungen unserer Armee im Auge hatte. Er hatte aber zugleich den schwersten Stand gegenüber den Delegationen. Kriegsminister Schönaich -- in jener Zeit wurde auch durchgesetzt, daß die Bezeichnung Reichskriegsminister oder gemeinsamer Kriegsminister fiel und der Kriegsminister der Monarchie eben nur den Titel Kriegsminister führte -- persönlich eine konziliante Natur, ein vollendeter Weltmann, tat, was ein Politiker in Situationen wie die seine war, tun muß: er schloß ein Kompromiß. Dieses Kompromiß reduzierte seine Forderungen, aber es wurde wenigstens durchgesetzt und damit hatte Schönaich schon sehr viel erreicht und die Mittel wenigstens zum Beginn der Heeresreform erhalten. Schönaich trat im September des Jahres 1911 zurück. Er wurde von Kaiser durch ein außerordentlich warm gehaltenes Handschreiben ausgezeichnet und gehörte bis zu seinem so jähen Ableben zu jenen Persönlichkeiten, die sich des besonderen Wohlwollens und Vertrauens des Monarchen erfreuen.
Aus dem Leben des Generals.
G. d. I. Franz Freiherr v. Schönaich ist am 27. Februar 1844 geboren, stand somit im 72. Lebensjahre. Er erhielt seine militärische Ausbildung in dem Kadettininstitut in Hainburg und später in der Wiener=Neustädter Militärakademie, aus der er im Jahre 1862 als Leutnant ausgemustert wurde. Schönaich machte den schleswig- holsteinischen Feldzug vom Jahre 1864 und den Krieg mit Preußen im Jahre 1866 mit und nahm an der Schlacht von Königgrätz teil. Nach dem Feldzug besuchte Schönaich die Kriegsschule und wurde sodann zum Generalstab zur Dienstleistung einberufen. Vom Jahre 1870 bis 1887, in welcher Zeit Schönaich die militärische Stufenleiter vom Hauptmann bis zum Obersten zurücklegte, diente er bald im Kriegsministerium, bald bei der Truppe, bald als Generalstabschef einer Truppendivision und später als Generalstabschef des 5. Korps. Im Jahre 1887 wurde Schönaich dem Generaltruppeninspektor Erzherzog Albrecht zur persönlichen Dienstleistung zugeteilt. Während dieser Dienstleistung avancierte er zum Generalmajor. Nach dem Tode des Erzherzogs Albrecht wurde er 1895 Kommandant der 8. Infanterietruppendivision und zum Feldmarschalleutnant befördert. Im Jahre 1899 erhielt er die Berufung als Sektionschef im Kriegsministerium und in dieser Stellung hatte er zeitweise als Stellvertreter des Kriegsministers zu fungieren. Nach dem Rücktritt Kriegshammers wurde Schönaich zum Korpskommandanten in Josefstadt und im Jahre 1904 zum Feldzeugmeister ernannt. Als Graf Welsersheimb aus dem Ministerium Koerber ausschied, wurde Schönaich am 11 März 1905 zum österreichischen Landesverteidigungsminister ernannt. Als solcher kam er in die Lage, seine Stellung zu den Armeefragen zu präzisieren, und er tat dies in einer Rede. die er am 8. Februar 1905 im Wehrausschuß des Abgeordnetenhauses hielt. Am 20. Oktober 1906, nach Rücktritt Bitreichs wurde Schönaich zum Kriegsminister ernannt, aus welcher Stellung er erst im September 1911 schied. Was er in dieser Zeit für die Wehrmacht der Monarchie geleistet hat, ist so epochal, daß es noch in frischer Erinnerung ist. Schon als Landesverteidigungsminister gab Schönaich die Initiative zur Aufstellung der Landwehrartillerie bei beiden Landwehren. Vielleicht war diese weitblickende Tätigkeit Schönaichs an manchen Stellen dafür entscheidend, den bewährten Landesverteidigungsminister zum Nachfolger Pitreichs zu erwählen.
Vom ersten Tage seiner Ernenung zum "Reichskriegsminister" hat G. d. I. Baron Schönaich konsequent die Idee verfolgt, der Stagnation in der Entwicklung der Wehrmacht ein Ende zu machen; es mußten gerade damals, um die unumgänglich notwendige Aufstellung der Maschinengewehrabteilungen, neuer Artillerieformationen, Telephonpatrouillen etc. durchführen zu können, die sogenannten "Notbehelfe" geschaffen werden. Ein rascheres Tempo in der Durchführung dringender Reformen konnte erst in der Annexionskrise eibgesschlagen werden. Die damals durch das augenblickliche Gebot veranlaßten Anschaffungen und getroffenen Vorsorgen sind, da es zum Kriege nicht kam, zu einem vielfach zu wenig gewürdigten Gewinn für die Steigerung der Wehrhaftigkeit des Heeres geworden. Die Energie, mit der in jenen Tagen die Umbewaffnung der Artillerie, die Ausgestaltung der Maschinen-gewehrabteilungen, die Einführung der fahrbaren Feldküchen, der Telephon- und Telegraphenpatrouillen etc. durchgeführt wurden, sind nur einzelne Beispiele der geradezu unglaublichen Leistungen, welche damals in Tagen vollbracht wurden. Der Kriegsminister Baron Schönaich hat schon zu jener Zeit ein Programm für die Wehrreform- ausgearbeitet, dessen Durchführung sofort eine halbe Milliarde in Auspruch genommen hatte. Die allgemeine Finanzlage und der Umstand, daß für die Kriegsmarine zu gleicher Zeit über 300 Millionen Kronen in Auspruch genommen werden mußten, nötigten zu einer Einschränkung des Programms, welches für die nächsten fünf Jahre (1910 bis 1915) gelten sollte. Auch das Zugeständnis für das eingeschränkte Programm machten die beiden Regierungen nur gegen die bestimmte, den Ausschüssen der Delegation mit dem Programm und dessen Motivierung bekanngegebene Zusage, daß innerhalb dieses Zeitraumes seine Mehrforderungen für Heereszwecke erhoben werden.
Nach einer fast fünfjährigen stets belobten und durch alle, die Huld des Kaisers aussprechenden Auszeichnungen geehrt, ist G. d. I. Baron Schönaich im September 1911 in der Ruhestand getreten. Nahezu drei Jahre lebte Schönaich seinen privaten Neigungen. Als Ende Juli 1914 der Weltkrieg ausbrach, duldete es ihn nicht länger in seinem beschaulichen Tuskulum, in seiner Villa in Hütteldorf. Er trat an die Spitze des Militär-Witwen- und Waisenhilfsfonds und half jene große, humane Institution aufrichten und ausbauen, die ihre Segnungen erst späteren Jahren zuwenden darf.
General Schönaich und der Witwen= und Waisen=hilfsfonds.
Der österreichische Witwen- und Waisenhilfsfonds versendet folgenden Nachruf für seinen verstorbenen\ Präsidenten: Es ist ein guter, edler Mann gestorben. Doch ihnen allen, den vielen Tausenden Witwen und Waisen, die der Krieg hinterläßt, ihnen war er mehr! Wieviel Elend Präsident Schönaich gelindert, wieviel Tränen er durch sein ureigenstes Werk, den Witwen- und Waisenhilfsfonds, getrocknet hat, das werden erst künftige Generationen in ihrer ganzen Tragweite ermessen können. Niemand, der der Gründungssitzung des Witwen- und Waisenhilfsfonds beiwohnte, wird je der markigen und aus tiefstem mitfühlenden Herzen kommenden Worte vergessen, mit denen Baron Schönaich damals die charitative Fürsorge für die Kriegerwitwen und =waisen der Gesellschaft zur ernstesten, unabweisbaren Pflicht machte. Unter dem tiefen Eindrucke der Darlegung Schönaichs wurde der Witwen- und Waisenhilfsfonds gegründet, Baron Schönaich selber über Vorschlag des Erzherzogs Leopold Salvator zum Präsidenten gewählt.
Das war am 10. August 1914. Seit diesem Tage hat Baron Schönaich nur mehr dem Witwen- und Waisenhilfsfonds gelebt, jede Stunde seines arbeitsfreudigen Lebens ihm gewidmet. Nicht einen Tag versäumte er, und wenn ihn Krankheit und Schmerzen so sehr peinigten, daß er ans Zimmer gefesselt war, dann mußte ihm auch im Krankenzimmer eingehend referiert werden. Nur Schönaichs initiativem Wirken, nur seiner markanten Persönlichkeit und nur seinem überragenden Organisationstalent konnte es gelingen, aus dem als Komitee sich zuerst bescheiden konstituierenden Witwen- und Waisenhilfsfonds eine die ganze Monarchie umfassende Organisation zu schaffen, welche erst unlängst ihre Krönung durch den Entschluß Seiner Majestät des Kaisers fand, als Protektor an die Spitze derselben zu treten. Das Vermächtnis Schönaichs aber, den Witwen- und Waisenhilfsfonds, wird man zu hüten und zu schirmen, vor allem aber im Geiste des Verstorbenen fortzuführen haben.
Baron Schönaich und Richard Wagner.
So sehr Schönaich in erster Linie Offizier war und ganz von den großen Aufgaben ausgefüllt wurde, die er im Laufe seiner verantwortungsvollen Karriere zu bewältigen hatte, reservierte der verstorbene General einen großen Teil seiner freien Zeit seinen privaten Neigungen. Er war nicht nur selbst ausübender Künstler, er hatte für Musik eine wahre Leidenschaft, der er sich widmete, auch wenn das Leben viel ernstere Auforderungen an ihn stellte. Eine große Verehrung brachte Schönaich Richard Wagner entgegen, den er als "grüner Offizier" im Hause seiner Stiefeltern kennen und schätzen zu lernen Gelegenheit hatte. Franz v. Schönaich und sein Bruder, der bekannte Musikschriftsteller Gustav, waren bekanntlich Stiefsöhne des Wiener Kunstmäzens Standhartner, in dessen Haus Richard Wagner während seines Wiener Aufenthaltes liebe- und teilnahmsvolle Aufnahme fand. In ungezählten Feuilletons und Schilderungen hat Baron Schönaich der unvergeßlichen Stunden gedacht, die er mit Richard Wagner gerade in jener Zeit verleben durfte. Richard Wagner anderseits interessierte sich für den jungen ambitionierten Offizier, an den er auch später dachte, als er Wien verlassen hatte, wie er auch in Briefen an Standhartner sich um das Schicksal seines damals jungen Freundes kümmerte. Nicht weniger interessant ist das Verhältnis des verstorbenen Generals zu Erzherzog Albrecht, zu dessen persönlicher Dienstleistung Baron Schönaich kommandiert wurde und in der Nähe des Feldmarschalls bis zu seinem Tode verblieb. Erzherzog Albrecht hatte das administrative Talent, vor allem aber auch seine glänzenden Eigenschalten als Offizier erkannt und ihn oft zu Missionen befohlen, bei denen es vor allem auf repräsentative Qualitäten ankam. Erst nach dem Tode des Erzherzogs avancierte Schönaich zum Divisionär in Josefstadt, von wo aus dann ihn eine verhältmismäßig glänzende Karriere wieder nach Wien brachte.
Wiener Zeitungsausgabe
29. Jänner 1916Mit Freiherrn von Schönaich ist einer der populärsten Generale der k. u. k. Armee dahingegangen. Die Populärität und das Ansehen Schönaichs waren wohl begründet; Franz von Schönaich hat es nicht allein verstanden, über sein ureigenstes Gebiet hinaus zu wirken und der Armee jenes allgemeine Interesse wieder zuzuwenden, das zu ihrem Gedeihen im modernen Staate notwendig ist, er hat auch den ersten Anstoß gegeben zu weitgreifenden Reformen, deren unsere Armee dringend bedurfte und deren Bedeutung gerade jetzt im Kriege zum Vorschein kommen. Er war der Schöpfer unserer Wehrreform und der Urheber der modernen Militärstrafprozeßordnung. Was Freiherr v. Schönaich außer diesen zwei Gesetzen während seiner Tätigkeit als Kriegsminister geschaffen, wird in der Geschichte der Armee fortleben. Flüchtig und ohne Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit seien nur angefüht: die Gagenregulierung für Offiziere und Militärbeamte, die Schaffung eines Quartiergeldbeitrages für die in den Ruhestand tretenden Gagisten, die Erhöhung der Pensionen der Offizierswitwen, die Vermehrung der Stabsoffiziers= und Hauptmannsstellen bei den Regimentern behufs Verbesserung der Abancementsverhältnisse, die Zeitgemäße Umarbeitung der Vorschrift für das ehrenrätliche Verfahren, die Einführung der Ernteurlaube, die Gründung des Unteroffiziersfonds, die Einführung der neuen Felduniform, der fahrbaren Feldküchen usw. Die großen organisatorischen Leistungen des Kriegsministers Schönaich in der Zeit der Krise 1908 bis 1909: Neubeiraffnung der Feldartillerie, Formierung der Gebirgsartillerie, der Maschinengewehrabteilungen, Einführung der Telegraphen= und Telephonabteilungen und so fort - sie bilden wohlvorbedacht die Grundlage unserer Wehrreform.
Baron Schönaich als Soldat war keine jener schaumgeborenen bequemen Karrieren, welche durch die Absolvierung der Kriegsschule allein sich den Weg zu den höchsten Chargen geebnet haben. Bevor Schönaich in die Kriegsschule trat, hatte er - 1862 aus der Wiener=Neutstädter Militärakademie ausgemustert - als 20 jähriger Leutnant im Feldjägerbataillon Nr. 11 den Feldzug im Jahre 1864 mitgemacht, aber bevor er noch den ersten Jahrgang der Kriegsschule absolviert hatte, zog er wieder - 1866 - mit seinem Battaillon in den Krieg. Raum hatte er nach Vollendung der Kriegsschule mit sehr gutem Erfolge die Einteilung in den Generalstab erreicht, wurde dieser aufgelöst. Nicht die erworbenen theoretischen Erfolge der Kriegschule, sondern angeborene Begabung und soldatische Tüchtigkeit sollten maßgebend sein bei der Auswahl der Truppenoffiziere für den Dienst bei den höheren Stäben. Auch diese Forderung konnte die Karriere des jugendlichen Generalstabshauptmannes nicht hemmen, der bald (1877 bis 1881) als Major und Oberstleutnant Generalstabschef der 34. Infanterie=Truppendivision in Przemhsl, 1881 bis 1883 als Kommandant des 9. Feldjägerbataillons und 1883 bis 1887 als Generalstabschef des 5. Korps sich hervorragend bewährte. Im Oktober 1887 wurde Oberst Schönaich zum damaligen Generalinspektor des Heeres Feldmarschall Erzherzog Albrecht berufen, an dessen Seite Schönaich auch als Generalmajor bis zum Tode des Erzherzogs eine erfolgreiche Wirksamkeit entfaltete. Nach dem Tode des Erzherzogs wurde Schönaich Divisionär in Innsbruck und von hier 1899 als Sektionschef und Stellvertreter des Ministers ins Kriegs=ministerium kommandiert; 1902 übernahm er das Kommando über das 9. Korps . Im März 1905 wurde Schönaich zum Landesverteidigungsminister und Oktober 1906 zum Reichskriegsminister ernannt. Auf dem letztgenannten Posten beschloß General der Infanterie Baron Schönaich am 21. September 1911 seine fast fünfzigjährige, an Erfolgen, Ehren und Auszeichnungen reiche Dienstzeit. Der Krieg hat den Zweiundsiebzigjährigen wieder herbeigerufen und vor eine große Aufgabe gestellt: Als Präsident des k. u. k. Militär=Witwen= und Waisenfonds hat Freiherr von Schönaich die Organisierung dieser großen Institution ins Leben gerufen und geleitet.
.
Gordon Brook-Shepherd, Archduke of Sarajevo: The Romance and Tragedy of Franz Ferdinand of Austria. (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1984).
p. 119 [1906-1911]: "While he was still waiting for his own hour to come, all Franz Ferdinand could do was press the Emperor and his ministers for modernization and reform. The most effective helper he ever found to exert such pressure lived and worked with him in the Lower Belvedere for nearly six years: Major (later Colonel) Alexander Brosch von Aarenau, the handsome officer shown riding to his death in that painting in Vienna's War Museum. Their instrument was Franz Ferdinand's so-called 'Military Chancery'. In the first years of its existence this had been little more than a post office, passing on, for the Archduke's perusal, only such documents as the Emperor's Adjutant-General, Baron Arthur Bolfras, thought fit to send over. Its first two heads had been amiable nonentities who found even this limited work too much for them.
"But when, on 16 January 1901, Brosch, then a relatively young staff officer, was put in charge, the chancery was transformed from a post office into a power house. The staff was rapidly increased from two officers to fourteen (almost the same size as the Emperor's own Military Chancery), and its responsibilities were expanded accordingly. Within little more than three months, Franz Ferdinand was receiving, on the Emperor's orders, every document of significance from the War Ministry. Briefings from other ministries followed and, increasingly, the ministers themselves as well as the ambassadors accredited to the Emperor's court came for audiences at the Belvedere also. Increasingly, too, the traffic in ideas became a two-way flow often leading to collisions. Those ministers whom the Archduke liked or found opposed to his ideas he and Brosch intrigued to install or get. rid of - succeeding, for example, in appointing Baron Schönaich to the War Ministry in 1906 and then, when he proved a disappointment, in getting him shifted in 1911."
Vladimir Dedijer, The Road to Sarajevo. (London, UK: Macgibbon & Kee, 1967).
p. 116 [1906]: "The Archduke's actual influence in the empire's politics was derived from his power over appointments to key posts. For instance, in 1906 he succeeded in effecting the nomination of his protégés to some of the most important posts in the administration. To replace the seventy-six-year-old General Beck-Rzikowski, the energetic Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf became chief of the General Staff. In place of Count Agenour von Goluchowski, the Archduke saw that the post of foreign minister went to Count Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal. Count Franz von Schönaich became minister of war, and the Archduke's teacher and friend Max Vladimir Beck was appointed prime minister.
"Yet with most of them the Archduke was soon in conflict. The reason was not only the Archduke's bad temper and lack of tact; the new appointees had to follow the instructions of the Emperor Franz Josef and not those of the Archduke. Relations between the Emperor's Schönbrunn and Franz Ferdinand's Belvedere became strained...."
Alan Palmer, Twilight of the Habsburgs: The Life and Times of Emperor Francis Joseph. (New York, NY: Grove Press, 1995).
pp. 298-299 [1906]: "At almost the same time that autumn Count Goluchowski, a tired man exasperated by the attitude of Hungary's political leaders, let the Emperor know he had decided he must give up the foreign ministry. Francis Joseph had little doubt whom he wished to see as Goluchowski's successor; he had the highest opinion of Baron Aehrenthal, the ambassador at St Petersburg for the past seven years. With his attention thus concentrated on the Ballhausplatz, he was prepared to give his nephew a freer hand in finding incumbents for the two military posts than at a less pressing moment. For the war ministry the Archduke had a ready candidate in Baron von Schönaich (who. in fact, soon offended his patron by over-leniency towards Hungary);...."
Edward Crankshaw, The Fall of the House of Habsburg. (New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1963).
pp. 352-253 [1906]: "Nobody knows what sort of Emperor [Archduke Franz Ferdinand] would have made, or even how his character would have developed once the ultimate responsibility was his: so many of his words and actions were the words and actions of a man in a fury at his own powerlessness to act at all. He was impatient; he was self-willed. But he was essentially a torrent constantly overflowing its too constricted banks. Thus he frequently swung quite wildly from one course to another. He was not without sense. He could apologize gracefully when he had lost his temper. He needed more than anything else the discipline of responsibility to contain his impulses. He was highly intelligent, though in some disastrous ways ignorant. He had imagination. [Austrian Minister President Ernest Ritter von] Koerber, who knew all about his bull-headed ways, once said of him: 'Who knows but that as Emperor he might not have become a downright liberal?' Schönaich, the Minister of War, whom Franz Ferdinand attacked with venom - and success - observed: "The Heir Apparent will make more concessions in twenty-four hours than the Emperor Franz Josef has made in twenty-four years"*
"He had an eye for reality. Because of his association with Conrad von Hötzendorf he was popularly regarded as a militarist and the leader of a war party: in fact he quarrelled incessantly with Conrad, his own nominee, on the matter of peace and war. He was indeed ready to fight the Italians, but throughout all the crises of the first fourteen years of the century he was immovable on the need to maintain peace with Serbia. He disapproved even of the Annexation [of Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1908]. He, with Conrad, strove manfully to reform the armed services and to be prepared for war; but, for all his verbal violence, he detested war. Above all he was determined to avoid any cause for conflict with Russia. This is one of the few things we know about him for certain; that and the fact that in his view the only task for Austrian statesmen was to keep the Empire intact in face of threats from without and within until he was in the saddle. It was this not unusual obsession that led to his many contradictions.
"The year 1906 was the beginning of those contradictions. In that year Aehrenthal went to the Ballhausplatz, Schönaich became Minister of War, and Beck was made Prime Minister of Cisleithania. In the same year, on Franz Ferdinand's insistence, Conrad von Hötzendorf was appointed Chief of Staff."
*Rudolf Kiszling, Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand von 'Österreich-Este' (Vienna, AU; , 1953). p. 255.
p. 355 [1906]: "When Aehrenthal, whom he respected for his pro-Russian leanings, Schönaich, whom he respected because he thought he was strong, and Beck, whom he respected and admired as his first preceptor - when these three came to office all in one year, Franz Ferdinand wrote gleefully to Beck: 'With such a trifolium, Beck, Aehrenthal and Schönaich, we shall get on famously.'** But within three years he had turned against them all. Schönaich, he thought was weak about the army; Aehrenthal (who was married to a Hungarian) made too many concessions to the Hungarians and, with the Annexation, had turned Russia against Austria; Beck had also, he thought, shown weakness towards the Hungarians, and, on top of that, by introducing the Universal Suffrage Bill and pushing it through, had irreparably damaged the fabric of his inheritance."
**Franz Ferdinand to Beck, 26 Oct 1906. Kiszling, op. cit., p. 94.
Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War. A volume in the series The Making of the 20th Century. Geoffrey Warner, Series Editor. (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1991).
pp 35-36 [1906]: "As commander of the Habsburg military and naval forces the emperor always placed his responsibilities for the security of the state first. Promotions, budgets, troop assignments and military plans were a staple of his bureaucratic life. On foreign policy issues he dealt in general principles and within parameters, on military matters he dealt with precise personnel assignments and mundane affairs. In Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf as chief of the General Staff after 1906, Franz Joseph had a subordinate who repeatedly demanded the modernization of the military forces. Regrettably, the emperor soon found Conrad clashing with others in the government: War Minister Franz von Schönaich over budgets, Foreign Minister Aehrenthal over Italy and subsequently Foreign Minister Berchtold over a fight with Serbia. Franz Joseph became a pivotal figure in keeping the army chief restrained."
p. 38 [1906]: "Already in 1906 Franz Ferdinand had participated in the appointment of Conrad as chief of the General Staff and Schönaich as war minister. Thereafter Franz Ferdinand effectively controlled one of the two senior military positions."
p. 46 [1911-12]: "At the start of 1912 General Moritz von Auffenberg served as war minister, having come to power as a protégé of the heir-apparent in the autumn of 1911. Although Auffenberg never enjoyed Franz Joseph's confidence, he achieved two things during 1912 that none of his immediate predecessors had managed: an increase in the size of the common army and a substantial jump in military spending.
"Auffenberg had replaced Franz von Schönaich as war minister in September 1911. Already inclined to criticize the monarchy's military readiness, the war minister quickly discovered that conditions were worse than he had anticipated. Almost immediately he campaigned to increase the military budget and renewed the efforts to build a larger army. When refused funds for artillery purchases, Auffenberg ordered the materiel anyway. Chastised for this unilateral action, Auffenberg chose to moderate his tactics but not his goals."
pp. 48-49 [1911]: "The views and strategic conceptions of the chief of the General Staff thoroughly shaped the drafting of war plans, possibly more so in the Habsburg forces than in any other European military establishment. No army was so dominated by its chief as were the Danubian forces by General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf. From the moment he succeeded the ageing Friedrich Beck as chief in November 1906, Conrad worked to expand his powers to press for increases in military manpower and budgets and to prepare Austria-Hungary for the war he believed would come. Continuously, acerbically, tenaciously, he argued for more military funds from War Minister Schönaich. A tough bureaucratic infighter Conrad overstepped the bounds in late 1911 by demanding an attack on Italy while it was fighting in North Africa against the Turks. Franz Joseph relieved him in November 1911 at Foreign Minister Aehrenthal's insistence. Only a year later, however, Franz Ferdinand successfully pressed the emperor to restore Conrad, since the archduke did not believe that Conrad's replacement, General Blasius Schemua. had the experience to handle the Balkan crisis. From December 1912 until March 1917, Conrad remained chief of staff, an overall tenure longer than any of his counterparts in the European armies and possibly none with more disastrous consequences for his own government."
p. 69 [1908]: "Aehrenthal worked meanwhile to secure the approval [for Annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina] of his associates in the Habsburg government. Worried about the pace of the Young Turk revolt, Franz Joseph readily agreed to annexation. Significantly, the Thronfolger was not informed. Aehrenthal feared Franz Ferdinand might prematurely tell Kaiser William II about Vienna's intentions. Conrad, as expected, backed the action and still hoped that he might have a showdown with Serbia. War Minister Schönaich and Common Finance Minister Burian assented. But the Austrian and Hungarian prime ministers expressed major reservations over the intended annexation in a Common Ministerial Council meeting on 19 August....Their resistance forced the foreign minister to delay any further steps and necessitated a second Council meeting in Budapest on 10 September. This time the two prime ministers gave their support."
pp. 78-79 [1911]: "Aehrenthal had more success within the monarchy as he retained complete control over Habsburg foreign policy. In the months after the Bosnian crisis the minister had defended his policy adroitly and forcefully. Clearly he was the dominant personality in the Habsburg policy process. To be sure, his relations with the Archduke Franz Ferdinand had cooled, not least because of Aehrenthal's careful efforts to appease the Magyar political leadership over the military budget and the unauthorized dreadnought construction. But the minister's biggest challenge came from his constant antagonist - Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf. The general continually pressed the foreign minister with his advice, while always professing not to interfere in the making of diplomatic policy. Disappointed that Aehrenthal had not brutalized the Serbs, the chief of the General Staff lectured the foreign minister on the Serbian danger, the need for more funds and men for the army and the advantages of a reckoning with the unreliable Italian ally. In 1911, when new tensions flared in Albania, Conrad urged Aehrenthal to prepare for a showdown with Turkey over Albania. On one occasion he predicted that the Italians would attack in 1912 - a Cassandra-like pronouncement that Aehrenthal referred to Ambassador Mérey in Rome for evaluation. The ambassador rightly concluded that no one could make such an assertion. Deciding when a country would be ready to fight, Mérey wrote, would only be made when the moment came. But such common sense did not deter Conrad. The general harassed Aehrenthal and War Minister Schönaich relentlessly to prepare for an Italian attack and on the need for larger military budgets.
"In the summer of 1911 the clashes between Conrad and Aehrenthal reached new highs. The general accused Ambassador Mérey of overlooking incidents of Italian espionage against the Danubian monarchy. Aehrenthal defended his ambassador and demanded an apology. Even General Bolfras, head of the emperor's military chancellory tried to mediate, only to have Conrad retort that he would cut off his arm before writing a contrite note. Then came the Italian attack on Tripoli. Conrad immediately proposed that the Habsburgs attack their Italian ally. This time Aehrenthal struck back. Preparing a long memorandum of indictment against Conrad on 22 October 1911, the foreign minister sought Franz Joseph's resolution of who controlled Habsburg foreign policy. On 15 November the emperor pointedly told Conrad that the monarchy's policy was a policy of peace; there would be no attack on Italy. Then on 30 November the emperor abruptly relieved Conrad of his duties as chief of the General Staff, to the delight of Aehrenthal, the Italians and possibly even of Conrad's sometime patron, Franz Ferdinand. Blasius Schemua became the new army commander and Conrad assumed the post of army inspector. The general's only satisfaction from his exit came from the fact that Schönaich was also out, replaced by Auffenberg who almost immediately began to clash with Aehrenthal over the poor condition of the Habsburg military forces."
Hertha Pauli, The Secret of Sarajevo: The Story of Franz Ferdinand and Sophie. (New York, NY: Appleton-Century, 1965).
pp. 187-188 [1906]: "He would be thinking of issues and speaking of men, calling them fools or criminals, his temper and strong language deceived all but those who observed him at length, at some distance - men such as Koerber, or [Albert Freiherr von] Margutti, or Schönaich, his choice for war minister, who prophesied that the heir would 'yield more in twenty-four hours than Emperor Franz Joseph in twenty-four years.'"
p. 202 [1906]: "All at once the empire's whole superannuated top echelon seemed in a state of flux, as though a glacier were beginning to break up. On the heels of Count Beck's resignation, War Minister Pitreich made way for Franz Ferdinand's choice, Baron Schönaich; and simultaneously his long-time bugbear, Goluchowski, yielded the foreign ministry on Ballhausplatz to Baron Aehrenthal, a frequent correspondent of the archduke's, whose belief in the three-emperor alliance he shared. Both the monarchy's key posts were suddenly held by men in Franz Ferdinand's confidence.
"A radiant optimism seized him. Even his distrust of the renegade State-Beck who had deserted Belvedere for Schönbrunn was forgotten. 'Thank God that Golu and, above all, the dreadful Pitreich are gone,' he wrote to him, two days after the shake-up. 'Their successors are men after my own heart. The trio of Beck-Aehrenthal-Schönaich will be splendid to work with!'"
p. 209 [1907]: "Franz Ferdinand felt sure that things were being kept from him. He told Brosch to keep his eyes open, and indeed the major soon heard of a top-level conference on military concessions in the new Hungarian pact, a meeting called by His Majesty at the instance of Prime Minister Beck, who had insisted that 'Archduke Franz Ferdinand must not hear of it, or else the whole matter would be buried on the spot.'
"The meeting, with War Minister Schönaich in the chair, took place on February 25 and broke up at 2 P.M. The participants were pledged to silence. At four Franz Ferdinand received the chief of Staff in Belvedere. 'Well,' he asked, 'what about the troops ?' Conrad, embarrassed, answered dutifully, that there had been a conference, but that he must not discuss it.
"'You see how I'm being left out again,' said the successor. He heard nothing from Beck, learned nothing from the Emperor. He sent Brosch to Schönaich, but the minister whom he had chosen for his post simply denied that talks such as suggested by His Highness had been or were going on."
p. 217 [1908]: "[Conrad] always kept faith with Franz Ferdinand, however, and never lost his confidence. The archduke could not help admiring Conrad's candor, his perfectionism, his capacity for work, his devotion to duty. There was a Spartan touch about the little general, who worked all winter with his windows open, not caring whether his visitors caught cold, and fought for his convictions, not caring whose toes he trod on. Early in 1908 he clashed with War Minister Schönaich, and the heir, whom Schönaich had ignored in the Hungarian negotiations, begged the Emperor to retain Conrad at all costs. He asked Conrad to suggest a new war minister, and again the name Potreich came up, only to be turned down."
p. 219 [1908]: "In July, while the diplomats.exchanged notes, a revolution broke out in Turkey. The sultan had to grant a constitution and call elections. A shocking specter loomed: were the nominally Turkish provinces that Austria had run for thirty years to send deputies to a parliament in Constantinople?
"Something had to be done, and Foreign Minister Aehrenthal resolved to do it. He proceeded in great secrecy, consulting only his envoys to the great powers, his cabinet colleagues, and the chief of staff. Opposition was minimal; the two men to express misgivings, Austrian Premier Beck and an ambassador, lost their jobs within three months. Reporting to the Emperor on the decisive cabinet meeting, Aehrenthal asked specifically that His Majesty say nothing to his heir.
"The 'trio Beck-Schönaich-Aehrenthal' that was to have been so 'splendid to work with' proved a trio of traitors.
"The ostensible reason given - that Franz Ferdinand was bound for the German maneuvers in Alsace and might be tempted to tell Wilhelm - did not stand up. And it soon occurred to Aehrenthal that his plan required an understanding with Russia that the Russophile archduke might help achieve. En route to Alsace, the archduke finally learned what was in the making: Bosnia-Herzegovina's formal annexation by the monarchy."
pp. 235 [1911]: "[Franz Ferdinand] stayed two months in Brioni and would have stayed longer except for news of trouble at home. Brosch reported that Conrad wished to resign, that collaboration between him and the war and foreign ministers had become impossible. 'I can't understand what His Majesty sees in those two,' the archduke said of the remaining members of his trio. 'A pernicious pair - Aehrenthal acting like the army commander-in chief, and Schönaich up to his neck in politics, each one fouls up what doesn't concern him. . . I've found Conrad frank and straightforward. His only fault is this rush to resign whenever he doesn't get all he wants. That won't make it easy to stick with him, . .'
"He wrote to Schönaich, asking him to resign, and when the minister did not react, he went to Franz Joseph. Military Chancellery I confidentially described this audience to Military Chancellery II as 'a cleansing little thunderstorm.' It produced agreement on a change in the war ministry, though not yet on Franz Ferdinand's candidate, General Auffenberg. The heir admitted that Auffenberg looked 'like a forty-year bank clerk disguised as a general,' but the man 'thought black-yellow.' He even favored reconstructing the monarchy; Brosch felt Auffenberg's thinking would mesh perfectly with the plans laid in Belvedere. This, of course, the archduke did not tell his uncle.
"Something else came up during the 'cleansing thunderstorm': in exchange for dropping Schönaich, Franz Joseph wanted to get rid of Conrad. The constant arguments for war were too unnerving. A new occasion arose that summer, when Italy grabbed tripoli from the Turks and Conrad called for Intervention, while the foreign ministry cited Italy's French and British support. The Emperor simply repeated, 'I can't make war on an ally.'"
Lavender Cassels, The Archduke and the Assassin: Sarajevo, June 28, 1924. (New York, NY: Stein and Day, 1985).
pp. 90-91 [1908]: "In the train between Salzburg and Munich [Archduke Franz Ferdinand] scribbled a pencilled letter to Aehrenthal saying that he must without delay make his position clear, and stated that he was not (underlined) in favour of the annexation:
In general, in view of the deplorable internal situation, I am absolutely opposed to all such dissipations of strength. I consider that only a consolidated strong state can indulge in them; since we, thanks to the struggle between the two halves of the Monarchy, the attempts to disrupt its unity, the chaos, are neither consolidated nor strong, I would prefer that no action be taken. If, however, those who advise the Crown nevertheless consider that the annexation is absolutely necessary, then I am against any kind of mobilisation, for this could give grounds for quite unnecessary interpretations, and only in favour of calling up some reserves, which can be done without seeking the consent of Parliament.
He could, he stressed, only agree to the annexation if Bosnia and Hercegovina 'are declared part of the territory of the Monarchy, that is to say as belonging to both halves of it'. In any event the present 'disastrous system' in the occupied provinces must be done away with, the Minister of Finance who was responsible for it sacked, and Feldzeugmeister Varesanin appointed Governor in Sarajevo with full powers. Apologizing for his bad handwriting because the train was jolting, Franz Ferdinand ended with a plea to Aehrenthal
This is my carefully considered belief about the affair, and I hope your Excellency will think it over and perhaps agree with me. I request your Excellency to keep me fully informed, for this is a matter of great importance which will be decisive both now and for the future.
It was a courteous letter and, all things being considered, restrained. He could have pointed out that few people would be more affected than him by the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, for this would add over a million South Slavs, many of them doubtfully loyal to the House of Habsburg, to his future subjects.
"Aehrenthal had no intention of keeping Franz Ferdinand fully in the picture. In addition to putting paid to Serbian claims for a Greater Serbia, he saw the annexation as an opportunity for giving a much needed lift to the prestige of the Monarchy which he was determined to exploit. He planned to ignore the stipulation in the Treaty of Berlin that no alteration to the status quo in the Balkans could be made without the agreement of the signatory Powers, and to present them with a fait accompli, thereby demonstrating that Austria-Hungary was capable of asserting itself and acting independently of any of them, including her ally Germany. It would be a coup which would establish him as a statesman in the Metternich tradition, which he was confident of pulling off provided he could square the only Power likely to be troublesome - Russia. This too he was confident of achieving; by the tine he received the Archduke's letter he was engaged in perfecting an exercise in diplomatic brinkmanship with the object of outsmarting the Czar's Foreign Minister, Izvolsky.
"Izvolsky along with visions of a coup, was seeking support for his own pet project, freedom of passage through the Dardanelles for Russian warships, and had hinted that it might be useful if he and Aehrenthal had a friendly discussion about this, and about Bosnia and Hercegovina. Towards the end of August Berchtold, on leave from St Petersburg at Karlsbad, on Aehrenthal's instructions told the Russian Foreign Minister who was also in Karlsbad, that Austria would in principle support the free passage of Russian warships through the Dardanelles, provided Russia placed no obstacles in the way of her annexing Bosnia and Hercegovina. He had a castle at Buchlau near Karlsbad, and suggested it might be useful if Izvolsky met Aehrenthal there for an informal review of these matters of mutual interest. Izvolsky agreed, and the meeting at Buchlau took place on September 11th 1908. The two Foreign Ministers were alone together for six hours- neither kept a record of what was said. After it Aehrenthal told Berchtold that Izvolsky had agreed to the annexation, and he had informed him that it would take place before long, assuring him that he would be notified of the date well in advance.
"Izvolsky departed to continue a leisurely tour of Western Europe. Aehrenthal went straight back to Vienna. On October 6th, 1908, when the Russian Foreign Minister was in Paris, Franz Joseph without prior notification to anyone, proclaimed that the Austro Hungary Monarchy had annexed Bosnia and Hercegovina."
p. 98 [1909]: "According to Brosch, because Franz Ferdinand constantly suspected that he was being underrated, he was jealous of any General or Minister on whom public attention was focused. When he returned to Vienna Conrad and Aehrenthal occupied the centre of the stage and his own position was undefined. Conrad found His Imperial Highness in a bad temper. He first complained that Schönaich the Minister of War and the Foreign Minister were intriguing against him, and later accused the Chief of Staff of conspiring with Aehrenthal, saying that everything was being done over his head."
pp. 124-125 [1911]: "By mid 1911 there was a great deal in the Monarchy which Franz Ferdinand was in no doubt urgently needed a push. Much of it concerned the armed forces. Although the building up of the navy, to which he had devoted over ten years of unremitting effort was progressing, and the first 20,000-ton battleship was about to be launched, there was still a long way to go before it could be any match for Italy's fleet in the Adriatic. Russia and Italy were each spending a quarter of their revenues on armaments, the Monarchy barely an eighth. The navy apart, large extra credits were urgently needed for every kind of military equipment, but the Council of Ministers refused to grant them. The manpower situation was even worse. The navy had to borrow 3,ooo men from the army to man new ships. It had only been possible to form a few much needed extra batteries of artillery by cutting down the number of regimental bands and replacing soldiers wherever possible by civilians. All units were below strength. But when a new army law increasing the annual quota of conscripts was presented to the Parliaments in Vienna and Budapest it was rejected, as so often before, by the Hungarians.
"The Archduke blamed the Minister of War for this state of affairs. He had long made no secret of his view, in which he was vehemently supported by Conrad, that Schönaich was useless, "weak" with the Hungarians, an 'aprés mois le déluge""man, only concerned to hang on to his job. He must go, and be replaced by someone capable of standing up to Aehrenthal, who opposed any large expansion of the army or increase in its budget on the grounds that this would cause the Monarchy to be accused of aggressive aims and encourage neighbouring states to increase their arms build up.
"After three months badgering by his heir, the Emperor in September reluctantly ordered Schönaich to resign, and appointed Auffenberg, the Archduke's nominee whom he personally disliked, Minister of War. A few days later Italy seized Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, the Sultan's North African provinces, and declared war on Turkey."
